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Summary. – This paper analyzes the impact of remittances on household consumption instability in 
developing countries on a large panel of developing countries. The four main results are the following: 
Firstly, remittances significantly reduce household consumption instability. Secondly, the insurance 
role played by remittances is highlighted: remittances dampen the effect of various sources of 
consumption instability in developing countries (natural disasters, agricultural shocks, discretionary 
fiscal policy). Thirdly, the insurance role played by remittances is more important in less financially 
developed countries. Fourthly, the overall stabilizing effect of remittances is mitigated when 
remittances over GDP exceed 8.5%. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent economic crisis has led policymakers and economists to rethink about the 
instruments for economic stabilization. One of the most damaging consequences of output 
shocks is the consumption instability which negatively affects risk adverse agents’ welfare. 
As pointed by Athahasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) and Pallage and Robes (2003), 
consumption instability could have detrimental consequences for the accumulation of human 
capital and physical capital.  
Consumption instability is driven by a complex array of factors (Wolf, 2004):  
economic shocks, the determinants of the household income elasticity with respect to shocks 
(risk management mechanism) and the determinants of the household consumption elasticity 
with respect to household income (risk coping mechanism). Several characteristics of 
countries shape the consumption instability. Economic size plays a crucial role: large 
economies with diversified production structure are more immune to both sector-specific 
shocks and—reflecting the negative association between size and openness—to external 
shocks. Financial development opens new diversification opportunities and dampens 
consumption instability. The effect of shocks on macroeconomic instability depends on the 
extent to which participation in international goods and asset markets allows for specialization 
and for risk diversification. Fiscal policy can be used to offset shocks, and to smooth 
consumption, but large fiscal imbalances are also a factor of macroeconomic instability. 
Otherwise, fiscal policy instability might be linked to consumption instability through the 
connection between public and household budgets (Herrera and Vincent, 2008). Institutional 
factors, such as democracy, lower social instability and hence smooth consumption.   
It is surprising to see that remittances are not present in the literature explaining 
consumption instability while several papers have recently analyzed the potential stabilizing 
impact of migrants' remittances (Chami et al, 2009; Bugamelli and Patterno, 2009; IMF, 2005 
and World Bank, 2006). The literature focuses on the low procyclicality and perhaps on the 
contracyclicality of remittances with GDP. Unlike other private capital flows, remittances 
tend to be a hedge against shocks.  
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Two mechanisms through which remittances might affect household consumption 
instability could be put forward. Firstly, remittances might act as a risk management 
mechanism. For instance, the remittance-receiving households in Burkina Faso and Ghana 
have housing built of concrete rather than mud and have greater access to communications, 
and they are less prone to natural shocks. Moreover, Ethiopian remittance-receiving 
households rely more on cash reserves during food crisis episodes, than the sale of productive 
assets (Mohapatra et al. 2009). Altogether, remittances constitute a factor of resilience at the 
household level which in turn contributes to protect the productive capacity through ex ante 
investments and then smooth income and promote economic growth.  
Secondly, remittances might reduce household consumption instability through their 
contribution to risk coping. According to Mohapatra et al. (2009), remittances rise when the 
recipient economy suffers a natural disaster. Yang (2008) also provides cross-country 
evidence on the response of international flows to hurricanes, and concludes that for poorer 
countries, increased hurricane exposure is associated with greater remittance flows as well as 
greater foreign aid. In contrast, other private flows (commercial lending, FDI, and portfolio 
investment), actually decline in response to hurricane exposure. Remittances might also act as 
a substitute for the low level of financial development: the marginal benefit of remittances 
received by households, increases with the low level of financial development (Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz, 2009).  
This paper tries to answer several questions concerning the contribution of remittances 
on household consumption instability. (i) Do remittances significantly reduce the level of 
household consumption instability? (ii) What is the main channel of the stabilizing effect: risk 
management or risk coping? (iii) What are the types of shocks that remittances insure against? 
(iv) Do the households’ financial constraints reinforce the stabilizing effect of remittances? 
(v) Is there a threshold level of remittances beyond which they increase macroeconomic 
instability?  
A large cross-section panel of developing countries is built. To deal with the 
endogeneity of remittances, the System-GMM-IV allows to instrument remittances by their 
lagged value as well as two external instruments: the remittances ratio received by neighbors 
and the weighted GDP per capita of migrants’ host countries. We find firstly that remittances 
significantly reduce household consumption instability. Secondly, the insurance role played 
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by remittances is confirmed. Thirdly remittances appear to be a hedge against natural 
disasters, agricultural shocks and discretionary fiscal policy. Fourthly, remittances work better 
in the less financially developed countries. Fifthly when remittances are too high, their 
stabilizing impact on consumption is weakened. 
The rest of the article is organized as follow. Section 2 is devoted to the empirical 
investigation of the relationship between remittances and household consumption instability. 
We construct an econometric model for this relationship, present the data, the estimations and 
discuss the preliminary results obtained. In Section 3, the hypothesis of the insurance role 
played by remittances when households faced various types of shocks is tested. The issue of 
threshold effects on the impact of remittances on consumption instability is addressed in 
section 4. Concluding remarks are presented in section 5. 
 
2. DO AND HOW REMITTANCES REDUCE HOUSEHOLD 
CONSUMPTION INSTABILITY? 
(a) The econometric model 
The following dynamic panel model which allows catching the impact of remittances 
on consumption instability is estimated: 
 ττττττ εηνφβρσασ ,,1,1,, = iiiiicci RX ++++′++ −      (1) 
c
i τσ , , is the standard deviation of the consumption growth rate estimated over 5 years.   Table 
1 in Appendix 1 presents the evolution of consumption instability. Sub-Saharan Africa is most 
affected by the consumption instability. Moreover, from 1980-1985 to 2000-2004, a declining 
trend of consumption instability can be observed.  
Table 1 
  i , τ  are respectively the country and the non-overlapping 5-year period. iν  and τη  
are respectively the country and period fixed effects. The former is included to control for 
time invariant heterogeneity and the later is included to control for common shocks at each 
period among countries in the sample. ε  is the idiosyncratic error term. It is worth noting that 
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estimation using panel data allows exploiting the time series nature of the relationship 
between remittances and consumption instability. Since the magnitude of remittance flows 
has changed substantially over time, this is an important advantage. The data are organized 
into a panel consisting of at most 89 countries over the period 1975–2004. The data are 
averaged over non-overlapping five-year periods so that – data permitting – there are six 
observations per country (1975-1979, 1980–1984, 1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, and 
2000–2004).  
R  is the remittances variable measured as the ratio of remittances to GDP.  X  is a 
matrix of control variables which includes:1 
    • Per capita income: consumption instability is expected to be lower in more developed 
countries (Auffret 2003; Bekaert et al., 2006). We include the logarithmic term of GDP per 
capita at the beginning of each period. 
    • Financial development: The degree of consumption smoothing could depend on the depth 
and on the efficiency of financial markets (Bekaert et al, 2006; Ahmed and Suardi, 2009). The 
ratio of credit provided by the banks to the private sector over GDP is considered to catch the 
intensity of financial constraints. 
    • Trade and financial openness: The literature on trade openness and macroeconomic 
instability likewise combines theoretical ambiguity with varied empirical findings. Enhanced 
real integration can lead to greater sectorial specialization but also provides greater 
diversification across demand sources (Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009). On the one hand 
financial openness increases the degree of exposure to world financial crises. On the other 
hand, financial openness offers new portfolio diversification opportunities. Trade openness is 
measured as the ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP. Financial 
openness is measured as the Chinn-Ito index rescaled to obtain only positive values. This 
index is introduced in a quadratic form to catch a threshold effect (Kose et al., 2003).  
    • Country size: Smaller economies are expected to suffer from higher consumption 
instability than larger economies. Moreover, smaller economies are less able to take 
advantage of economies of scale because their production is not diversified. Country size is 
measured by the logarithmic term of total population. 
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    • Democracy: Democracies not only set policies through consensus, but also allow greater 
decision-making diversification, hence leading to economic stability. In addition, democratic 
institutions may result in more macroeconomic stability through political competition: the 
risk-averse voters punish incumbent governments for economic instability. It is also plausible 
that democracies induce greater willingness to cooperate and to compromise in the political 
sphere, generating greater stability as a result. These theoretical arguments of a negative 
relationship between democracy and instability are supported by empirical studies (Acemoglu 
et al., 2003; Mobarak, 2005 and Yang, 2008). 
    • The discretionary fiscal policy:  Fatas and Mihov (2003) have shown that discretionary 
fiscal policy is an important factor of output instability. The notion of discretionary fiscal 
policy refers to changes in fiscal policy that do not represent reaction to economic conditions. 
Discretionary fiscal policy is associated with large household consumption instability given 
the interconnections between household consumption and public budget (Herrera and 
Vincent, 2008; Ahmed and Suardi, 2009). Fiscal policy instability2 is measured as the 
standard deviation of the residual component of the log difference of government 
consumption from an econometric model of the former over the log difference of GDP 
growth, a time trend and inflation in a quadratic form (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). 3 
    • Foreign aid: Foreign aid may contribute to enhance the risk management mechanism. 
Moreover, the countercyclical aid plays an insurance role. Aid is measured as the ratio 
between official development assistance to GDP. 
    • Lagged level of consumption instability: This variable catches the strong inertia which 
characterizes the dynamic of household consumption instability. 
If remittances increase when the recipient economy experiences a bad shock, 
estimation of 1φ  by the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator (OLS) is biased upward: the true 
impact of remittances on consumption instability will be underestimated. Moreover, the OLS 
estimator is inconsistent since the lagged dependent variable is positively correlated with the 
error term due to the presence of fixed effects. Hence an econometric strategy based on 
instrumental variables must be implemented. The equation in levels and the equation in first 
differences are combined in a system and estimated with an extended GMM estimator system 
which allows for the use of lagged differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables 
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as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998).4 The GMM estimations control for the endogeneity 
of the remittances and other explanatory variables.5  
Two external instruments are added: the ratio of remittances to GDP of all other 
recipient countries located in the same region and the log weighted GDP per capita for each of 
the migrant host countries (Aggarwal et al, 2006; Acosta et al., 2009).6 External instruments 
weaken the potential “weak instruments” problem that often arises in the context of traditional 
GMM estimation.  
Two specification tests check the validity of the instruments. The first is the standard 
Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The second test examines the hypothesis 
that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. 
(b) The preliminary results 
The results are presented in Table 3.  The baseline model (column 1) includes lagged 
value of dependent variable, trade openness, population and migrants’ remittances. As 
expected, the remittances significantly reduce household consumption instability. Trade 
openness and lagged dependent variable amplify consumption instability. In contrast, per 
capita income and population impact negatively and significantly the consumption instability.  
Table 3 
The next step consists of adding a battery of control variables in order to check the 
robustness of these results to changes in model specifications (see columns 2-9): financial 
development, financial openness, democracy, discretionary fiscal policy, foreign aid, GDP per 
capita instability. Whatever the controls introduced, the coefficient of migrants’ remittances 
remains strongly significant and negative. As in Kose et al. (2003), financial openness is 
related to consumption instability in an inverted U relationship: the benefits of financial 
integration only appear beyond a given threshold (column 3). Democracy is negatively 
associated with instability (column 4). Discretionary fiscal policy is a factor amplifying 
household consumption volatility (column 5). GDP per capita instability is a significant 
source of consumption instability (columns 7, 8 and 9).  
If remittances contribute to preserve the productive capacity through ex ante 
investments (risk management), then one can expect a stabilizing impact of remittances on 
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domestic production. We then introduce the GDP per capita instability to check whether the 
stabilizing impact of remittances on consumption is driven by the risk management channel. 
If this works, the coefficient of remittances should be no longer significant when the GDP 
instability is already controlled for.  The second channel through which remittances might 
stabilize household consumption is their contribution on risk coping, i.e. the insurance role of 
transfers during shock episodes. The residual impact of the remittances after controlling for 
GDP instability will capture the risk coping mechanism induced by remittances. In other 
words, without controlling for GDP instability (columns 1 to 6), risk coping and risk 
management mechanisms go through the remittances variable. After controlling for GDP 
instability (columns 7, 8 and 9), only risk coping is caught by the remittances variable since  
GDP instability depends on risk management strategies. Hence the comparison between the 
two specifications allows distinguishing the two mechanisms. It appears that when we add 
GDP per capita instability in the benchmark specification (column 1), the coefficient of 
remittances remains robustly significant and hardly changes (columns 7, 8 and 9). Hence the 
contribution of remittances on risk management seems negligible. We will explore in more 
detail, the role of migrants’ remittances as risk coping mechanism in the next sub-sections. 
(c) Alternative specifications related to the risk coping mechanism 
To test the contribution of remittances on risk coping, two alternative models can be 
run. The first one consists of a model including a multiplicative term of remittances crossed 
with the GDP per capita instability: 
( ) τττττττττ εηνβδσσφφρσασ ,,,,,2,11,, = iiiiyiyiiicci XRR +++′++×+++ −    (2) 
where τσ ,iy  is the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth over each sub-period. The 
hypothesis is that 02 <φ  so that remittances reduce the response of household instability 
( τφδ ,2 iR+ ) to macroeconomic shocks.  
An alternative strategy is to calculate a new dependent variable as the ratio of consumption 
instability to GDP per capita instability.7 An increase in this ratio means an inability of 
households to cope with shocks. The following model is estimated:8 
ττττ
τ
τ εηνβφα
σ
σ
,,,1
,
,
= iiii
i
y
c
i XR +++′++






       (3) 
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The results of the estimation are presented in Table 4.  Column 1-2 indicate the results 
of the estimation of model (2) while columns 3-7 present the results of model (3). Regarding 
columns 1 and 2, we notice that the coefficient associated to the interaction between 
remittances and the GDP per capita instability is significant and negative while the GDP 
instability, introduced additively, is positively related to consumption instability. Moreover, 
the coefficients of the remittances and of the interactive term are jointly significant. 
Remittances dampen significantly the effects of GDP instability on consumption instability. 
The threshold level of remittances is evaluated at 20% of GDP in column 1 and 16% in 
column 2 when foreign aid is included. Then, when the remittances are above these values, 
the full stabilization of aggregated shocks is observed. Nevertheless, it is not surprising to 
observe that this full insurance concerns only a very limited number of countries.  
In columns 3-7, remittances impact negatively the ratio of consumption instability to 
GDP instability: remittances increase the ability to cope with shocks. Whatever the control 
variables included, the coefficient of remittances remains significant and negative. When we 
look at the effects of control variables introduced we see that the ability to cope with shocks 
increases with the economic development, the financial development, the foreign aid, the 
democracy and the financial openness. Instead the trade openness and the dependency ratio 
play in the opposite direction.  
Table 4 
In short remittances appear to be a robustly effective risk coping mechanism in 
developing countries. The next step is to test the hypothesis that the insurance role played by 
remittances is larger in less financially developed countries. 
(d) Potential heterogeneity: Do remittances insure more in less financially developed 
countries? 
The first estimated model is the following: 
 
( ) τττττττττ εηνβδφφρσασ ,,,,,2,11,, = iiiiiiiicci XFDFDRR +++′++×+++ −   (4) 
where FD  represents the ratio of bank credit to GDP, a proxy of the level of financial 
development  and X ′  is the vector of control variables including GDP per capita growth 
instability. Our hypothesis is that 01 <φ  and 02 >φ  so the impact of migrants’ remittances 
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τφφ ,21 iFD+  is more stabilizing at low levels of financial development.9 Moreover, when 1φ  
and 2φ  have opposite signs, a threshold effect arises:  
2
1*
,,21
,
, 0 φ
φφφσ ττ
τ
τ
−=<⇔<+=
∂
∂ FDFDFD
R iii
i
c
. 
The results are presented in Table 5. We begin with a benchmark specification in 
which the controls are the lagged value of dependent variable, the logarithm of initial GDP 
per capita, the logarithm of the population, democracy, trade and the discretionary fiscal 
policy (column 1). The coefficient associated with remittances is negative and significant. The 
coefficient of the interactive term is positive and significant. The test of the joint significance 
of the two coefficients rejects the hypothesis that the two coefficients are statistically non 
significant. Then remittances work better in less financially developed countries. The 
threshold of private credit ratio is evaluated at 44% of GDP and 65 countries (90% of the 
sample) are located in the area of an overall stabilizing impact of remittances on consumption. 
We successfully test the robustness of this result by including in the model additional control 
variables: financial openness and foreign aid (columns 2-4). From columns 2 to 4, the 
threshold of financial development (the private credit ratio) is around 33% of GDP. Indeed, 
60 countries (80% of the sample) experience a robust and negative association between 
remittances and household consumption instability given their levels of financial development 
under the estimated threshold 
Table 5 
An alternative way to test the insurance role played by remittances depending on the 
level of financial development is to use, as previously, the ratio of consumption instability to 
GDP instability as the dependent variable. The interactive term of remittances with the level 
of financial development allows catching the decreasing marginal stabilizing impact of 
remittances with the level of financial development. Hence, the coefficient associated with 
this variable will be positive while the coefficient of remittances introduced additively will be 
negative. The following equation is estimated: 
( ) τττττττ
τ
τ εηνβδφφα
σ
σ
,,,,,2,1
,
,
= iiiiiii
i
y
c
i XFDFDRR +++′++×++






   (5) 
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The hypothesis is that 01 <φ  and 02 >φ  so that the impact of migrants’ remittances 
( τφφ ,21 iFD+ ) is more negative, i.e. more stabilizing, at low levels of financial development. 
The results are presented in Table 6. The matrix of control variables here includes the control 
variables used before.  
Table 6 
In column 1, as expected, the coefficient of the interaction between remittances and 
private credit ratio is positive while the coefficient of remittances and private credit ratio is 
both statistically significant and negative. Moreover, the coefficients associated with 
remittances and with the interactive term are jointly significant. So the contribution of 
remittances to the ability to cope with macroeconomic risk increases with the shallowness of 
the domestic financial market. The threshold of the private credit ratio is 34% and hence 
remittances smooth consumption in 87% of the countries.10  
An alternative model with rolling estimations for different values taken by the ratio of 
private credit is implemented. A new variable FDd  in interaction with the remittances variable 
is added in equation 4. FDd  is equal to 1 if the country has a value of private credit ratio 
greater than *FD  and 0 otherwise. This methodology for threshold determination in the case 
of endogenous regressors in a System-GMM framework has been previously implemented by 
Masten et al. (2008) and Chami et al. (2009).11 The following equation is specified: 
 ( ) ττττττ
τ
τ εηνβδφφα
σ
σ
,,,,2,1
,
,
= iiiiFDii
i
y
c
i XFDdRR +++′++×++






   (6) 
            with [ ]*= FDFDdFD ≥1   
5% of the sample is left on both sides of the private credit ratio scan interval to control 
for outliers. Private credit cutoffs from 0.5 to 0.5 percent of the private credit ratio to GDP are 
explored. The test for no nonlinear effect refers simply to the test of the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient on the interactive variable 2φ  is equal to zero. The results of simulations are 
presented in Figure 1 in Appendix. The first graph shows the evolution of the coefficient 2φ  
(the confidence interval of the coefficient at 95% is added in dot lines) and the second graph 
presents the statistical significance of the coefficient.  
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Figure 1 
2φ  is positive in several cases. Several observations can be identified as possible 
thresholds given their statistical significance at 5%. The first threshold range is located 
between 12% and 13.5% of private credit ratio and the second between 46.5% and 57.5%. 
The optimal cutoff which minimizes the Hansen test statistic is a level of private credit ratio 
equal to 13.5%. The corresponding estimation is shown in Table 7. All the diagnostic tests 
associated with the System-GMM estimator validate the specification. An increase in private 
credit and foreign aid improves the ability of households to smooth consumption.  
Table 7 
Hence, the enhancing role of migrants’ remittances on the ability of households to 
smooth consumption is effective up to this threshold (53% of countries). This value of the 
private credit ratio threshold is however different to that estimated from the model (5) in 
which we found a value around 34-36%. This difference arises from the fact that the rolling 
estimations allows for a determination of an optimal threshold identified among a wide range 
of potential thresholds. So, this result is preferred to the previous one. 
While the result of a reinforced stabilizing effect of remittances in less financially 
developed countries is intuitive, the opposite (remittances appears to lead to an instability of 
consumption in high financially developed countries) is more striking. One plausible 
explanation is that remittances are not invested on risk management mechanisms 
(diversification strategies) in high financially developed countries. Another explanation is that 
remittances might appear to be strongly procyclical in high financially developed countries 
and so exacerbate business cycles and thus fuel consumption instability. Indeed when the 
country is financially developed and thus insurance products are available for private entities, 
the level of countercyclical remittances is then reduced while procyclical remittances 
increase. 
3. WHAT SHOCKS ARE MITIGATED BY REMITTANCES? 
The following equation is estimated to test the hypothesis that remittances insure 
differently against natural disaster, agricultural and discretionary fiscal policy shocks (Sh): 
( ) τττττττττ εηνβδφφρσασ ,,,,,2,11,, = iiiiiiiicci XShShRR +++′++×+++ −    (7) 
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Natural disaster data are drawn from Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Diseases (CRED), International Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT).12 CRED defines a 
disaster as a natural situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a 
request for external assistance (Noy, 2009; EM-DAT Glossary of terms).13 We consider all 
disaster events taken together within a country in a year rather than each of them examined 
separately. Indeed different regions in a country can be affected by different types of disasters 
in a given year and since remittances data is available only at annual frequency and at the 
country level, we would not be able to separate the response of remittances for a specific 
disaster (Mohapatra et al., 2009). The reported measure of the total number of people affected 
is used. The number of people affected is divided by the total population in the year prior to 
the disaster year (Noy, 2009; Mohapatra et al., 2009). 
The hypothesis is that 02 <φ : the impact of migrants’ remittances ( τφφ ,21 iSh+ ) is 
more negative, i.e. stabilizing,  at high levels of shocks. Put differently, the equation will help 
to appreciate how remittances reduce the sensitivity τφδ ,2 iR+  of consumption instability with 
respect to each type of shock. Moreover, it allows computation of the remittances level which 
fully stabilizes each type of shock. The results are presented in Table 8. The variables of 
interest are the interactions between remittances and different shock variables.  
Table 8 
The coefficients associated with the interaction terms are highly significant and also 
negative while the shocks variables introduced additively are positively related to 
consumption instability. Moreover, whatever the specifications, the coefficients of the 
remittances and of the interactive terms are jointly significant. In column 1, the results suggest 
that remittances dampen significantly the effects of natural disasters on consumption 
instability. When the ratio of remittances is equal to 3%, a full stabilizing impact of 
remittances is observed. 
In column 2, natural disasters are replaced by agricultural shocks measured as the 
instability of the agricultural value added over GDP. Remittances are really a hedge against 
agricultural shocks and fully stabilize these shocks when the ratio is equal to 10%.  
Column 3 presents the result of the estimation including the interaction between 
remittances and fiscal policy shocks. It appears that remittances insure households against the 
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discretionary fiscal policy:  the coefficient associated to the interaction term of remittances 
with the discretionary fiscal policy variable is strongly significant and negative. The value of 
remittances which fully insure discretionary fiscal policy is around 9%. 
Altogether, these three results suggest that remittances appear to be a hedge at the 
household level against various types of shock. However, it appears that the level of 
remittances needed to fully offset the effects of each of these shocks is much lower in the case 
of natural disasters (3%) than in the two other types of shock (agricultural instability and 
discretionary fiscal policy). A relatively small amount of remittances is needed to offset the 
consequences of natural disasters. A possible explanation is that foreign aid may be a 
substitute for remittances in countries affected by natural disaster. It is more difficult to assess 
evidence that foreign aid reacts positively to discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
4. IS THERE A THRESHOLD EFFECT IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN REMITTANCES AND CONSUMPTION INSTABILITY? 
There is some evidence that the macroeconomic effects of remittances in the recipient 
economies may depend on the size of remittance flows (Abdih et al., 2008, Chami et al., 2008 
and Chami et al, 2009). Several explanations are proposed. Chami et al. (2008), using a 
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous labor supply, show that a 
high level of remittance-to- GDP ratio may actually enhance output instability due to the 
negative impact of these flows on the labor supply of remittance-dependent households. High 
levels of remittance-to-GDP may actually lead to higher levels of corruption (Abdih et al., 
2008). The countries which over long periods receive high remittances do not undertake 
reforms that diversify the economy and make it less sensitive to shocks. A high value of 
remittances may translate into an appreciation of the real exchange rate (Dutch disease 
effect).14 We test the hypothesis of a threshold for remittances beyond which their impact on 
consumption instability could be weakened. 
Several approaches can be followed to determine the relevant threshold of remittances. 
One can allow for a quadratic term of remittances in the consumption instability equation. The 
drawback of this approach is that the functional form is not necessarily “true”. A second 
approach may consist in ad hoc thresholds in remittances values, but it is not relevant. A third 
approach can consist in an endogenously determined threshold with the Hansen methodology. 
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But the principal assumption is the exogeneity of the threshold variable. Remittances are not 
exogenous. We then need a methodology which can be compatible with the instrumental 
strategy. Our approach, similar to Masten et al. (2008) and Chami et al. (2009), is based on 
rolling estimations for different values taken by the threshold variable. More precisely, we 
add in equation 1, a variable rd  in interaction with the remittances variable. rd  is equal to 1 if 
the country has a value of remittances greater than *R  and 0 otherwise. The following 
equation is specified: 
 ( ) τττττττ εηνφφβρσασ iiriiiicci dRRX +++×++′++ − 211,=    (8) 
            with, [ ]*= RRdr ≥1   
5% of the sample is left on both sides of the remittances scan interval to control for 
outliers. Remittance cutoffs from 0.5 to 0.5 percent of the remittances ratio are explored. The 
hypothesis that the coefficient on the interactive variable is equal to zero is rejected. Each 
equation corresponding to a different threshold is estimated by the System-GMM method. 
The results are presented in Figure 2. The first graph shows the evolution of the coefficient 2φ  
of the multiplicative term, the second graph presents the statistical significance of the 
coefficient and the third box shows the Hansen p-value associated with each of estimation. 
Figure 2  
If we take only those for which the p-value is less than 5%, two ratios of remittances 
can be selected: 6% and 8.5%. The optimal value of the remittances ratio is 8.5% which 
minimizes the Hansen statistic. Table 9 presents the estimation of the model on the basis of 
the threshold endogenously determined. 
Table 9 
When remittances exceed 8.5% of GDP (13 countries, 18% of the sample), the 
marginal stabilizing impact becomes weaker (column 1). Comparing to the 2% threshold 
computed by Chami et al. (2009) from an equation of output instability, the results suggest a 
high value of remittances at which a much weaker stabilizing effect on consumption is 
observed. The permanent income hypothesis which puts forward the fact that consumption is 
less volatile than income can provide an explanation. Then, remittances need to be very high 
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to lead to instability of consumption while much lower amount of remittances is sufficient to 
generate GDP instability. 
In column 2, the instability of GDP per capita is included in the model to highlight one 
possible origin of this non linearity. Indeed large remittances could enhance GDP instability, 
especially when the absorption capacity is low (Chami et al., 2009). It appears that the 
significance of the coefficients of the two remittances variables is lower than in column 1 and 
these results don’t invalidate the former intuition.  
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has analyzed the relationship between migrants’ remittances and household 
consumption instability. Using a large sample of developing countries over the period 1975-
2004 and after controlling for endogeneity of remittances, the econometric results suggest that 
remittance-recipient countries exhibit low instability of their household consumption. 
Remittances play an insurance role that is strengthened when the country is characterized by a 
low level of financial development. Remittances appear then to be a hedge against the GDP 
instability and more particularly against natural disaster, agricultural shocks and fiscal policy 
shocks. Finally, the insurance role of remittances is weakened when they exceed 8.5% of 
GDP. 
Given the stabilizing role of remittances on household consumption, the international 
community needs to take efforts to reduce the current high transaction costs of remitting 
money to labor-exporting countries. At present, high transaction costs resulting from lack of 
competition, regulation, and/or low levels of financial sector performance in labor-exporting 
countries act as a type of regressive tax on international migrants, who often tend to be poor 
and to remit small amounts of money with each remittance transaction. Lowering the 
transaction cost of remittances would help to increase the economic welfare-increasing impact 
of international remittances. 
This paper also highlights the schizophrenia of remittances. Indeed, remittances 
inflows are stabilizing on average for all recipients, but the stabilizing effects of remittance 
inflows appear to be achieved rather quickly when the remittances ratio is less than 8.5% and 
to weaken when inflows exceed this threshold due to the positive effect on output instability. 
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Countries receiving large remittance inflows may need to devise appropriate policies 
to deal with their possible negative consequences. Financial development should be enhanced 
not only to favor the inflows of remittances but also to effectively channel remittances into 
investment opportunities in high remittance-dependent countries. The negative effects of 
remittances for example through a real exchange rate appreciation in highly dependent 
countries emerge from the fact that in most cases, remittances are consumed, in particular on 
non-tradable goods and services. If such funds were otherwise channeled through investment, 
the real exchange rate appreciation and macroeconomic instability would attenuate or even 
disappear. Such attenuation is dependent upon the level of financial development in the 
recipient country (Acosta et al., 2009). 
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APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS OF ESTIMATIONS  
  
Table 1: Household consumption instability in developing countries 
 5-years sub-periods 
Regions 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 Average 
East Asia and Pacific 2.87 4.70 5.52 3.33 4.80 1.96 3.80 
Europe and Central 
Asia 
.. .. 3.85 9.23 7.82 4.81 6.28 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
7.39 7.62 6.03 6.02 5.06 3.56 5.90 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
6.19 4.92 6.38 6.29 4.29 3.09 5.01 
South Asia 6.35 3.66 2.47 3.10 5.80 2.83 4.01 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.32 7.96 10.11 9.49 7.03 6.38 8.16 
Average 7.18 6.97 7.70 7.41 6.11 4.62 6.50 
 
        
Table 2 : Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Sts. Dev 
 
Min 
 
Max 
1st order  
autocorrelation 
coefficient 
Instability of household consumption per capita 434 6.49 5.42 0.20 43.67 0.56* 
Initial GDP per capita (log) 625 6.77 1.06 4.44 9.02 0.98* 
Trade openness 645 73.27 39.43 2.35 226.87 0.92* 
Total population (log) 743 15.51 1.93 10.62 20.97 0.99* 
Remittances (% GDP) 513 3.98 8.30 0 80 0.92* 
Private credit ratio 523 22.35 18.93 0.41 145.31 0.89* 
Financial openness 629 1.51 1.18 0.18 4.53 0.81* 
Democracy 604 0.45 0.32 0 1 0.85* 
Government consumption (%GDP) 627 15.68 6.80 2.34 54.37 0.83* 
Discretionary fiscal policy 425 10.74 11.44 0.77 91.69 0.58* 
Aid (%GDP) 632 8.01 9.38 -0.02 58.05 0.81* 
GDP per capita instability 600 4.09 3.37 0.25 32.19 0.31* 
Dependency ratio 729 43.87 5.69 29.73 53.66 0.97* 
* significant at 5%  level. 
Countries (87) : Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovak Rep., South 
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian A.R., Tajiskistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Table 3: Impact of remittances on household consumption instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lag dependent var. 0.394*** 0.435*** 0.376** 0.352*** 0.345** 0.250* 0.427*** 0.226* 0.179* 
 (2.85) (3.31) (2.31) (2.74) (2.11) (1.77) (3.35) (1.69) (1.82) 
Initial GDP pc -0.950** -0.628 -0.929** -0.274 -1.048* -2.374*** -0.860** -0.646** -1.189 
 (2.27) (1.36) (2.24) (0.69) (1.68) (2.80) (2.33) (2.09) (1.31) 
Trade openness 0.047* 0.040* 0.032 0.045* 0.052 0.058*** 0.045* 0.029 0.035 
 (1.94) (1.70) (1.25) (1.77) (1.61) (3.03) (1.85) (1.03) (1.34) 
Population -0.960* -0.664 -0.599 -0.977* -1.643** -0.797* -0.689 -0.287 -0.563 
 (1.88) (1.09) (1.34) (1.94) (2.46) (1.75) (1.55) (0.54) (1.03) 
Remittances -0.158*** -0.151*** -0.167*** -0.156** -0.187*** -0.122** -0.166*** -0.124* -0.138** 
 (4.02) (3.81) (2.71) (2.08) (3.67) (2.27) (3.66) (1.85) (2.27) 
Private credit ratio  -0.023      -0.005 -0.008 
  (1.10)      (0.20) (0.33) 
Financial open.   3.115**     2.262* 2.867** 
   (2.02)     (1.87) (2.08) 
(Financial open.)²   -0.556*     -0.385* -0.505* 
   (1.87)     (1.67) (1.96) 
Democracy    -5.446**    -3.515* -3.060 
    (2.61)    (1.98) (1.48) 
Discretionary fiscal policy     0.162**   0.004 0.029 
     (2.02)   (0.06) (0.44) 
Aid      -0.252   -0.096 
      (1.47)   (0.61) 
GDP per capita instability       0.750*** 0.553*** 0.515** 
       (3.73) (2.69) (2.39) 
Constant 23.826** 17.416* 16.942* 21.698** 33.873*** 32.453*** 15.541* 10.120 18.395 
 (2.60) (1.76) (1.87) (2.45) (2.82) (2.98) (1.93) (1.04) (1.36) 
Observations 294 265 294 280 293 292 294 251 249 
Countries 87 77 87 81 87 87 87 72 72 
AR(1):p-value 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.022 0.001 0.005 0.005 
AR(2):p-value 0.107 0.196 0.083 0.196 0.601 0.285 0.546 0.677 0.825 
Hansen p-value 0.441 0.542 0.207 0.505 0.728 0.613 0.601 0.759 0.561 
Instruments 19 20 25 22 17 20 22 36 39 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are 
included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth 
rate of the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six non-overlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. 
Dependent variable: Household consumption instability. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 4: Insurance role of remittances: Alternative specifications 
Dependent variable Household consumption 
instability 
 Ratio of household consumption instability to GDP 
instability 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lag dependent variable 0.244* 0.181*       
 (1.86) (1.93)       
Initial GDP per capita -0.337 -0.577  -0.740*** -1.413*** -0.449* -0.571** -0.888* 
 (0.83) (0.84)  (3.04) (3.42) (1.87) (2.38) (1.90) 
Trade openness 0.018 0.040*  0.047** 0.053*** 0.057** 0.044* 0.050** 
 (0.94) (1.93)  (1.99) (2.80) (2.48) (1.76) (2.50) 
Population -0.900 -0.807*  0.241 0.122 0.382 -0.270 0.077 
 (1.44) (1.78)  (0.67) (0.36) (0.94) (0.51) (0.17) 
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.046 0.026       
 (0.58) (0.30)       
Democracy -2.057 -2.705     -1.391*** -0.698 
 (1.14) (1.31)     (2.67) (1.61) 
Private credit ratio -0.004 -0.011  -0.039** -0.044*** -0.038** -0.030 -0.032* 
 (0.22) (0.54)  (2.17) (2.74) (2.00) (1.51) (1.76) 
Financial openness 0.628 0.487  1.879 2.357** 1.301 0.769 1.315 
 (0.81) (0.62)  (1.45) (2.10) (1.29) (0.53) (1.21) 
(Financial openness)² -0.118 -0.102  -0.313 -0.387* -0.228 -0.168 -0.249 
 (0.75) (0.65)  (1.31) (1.83) (1.26) (0.71) (1.33) 
GDP per capita instability 0.757*** 0.775***       
 (3.88) (2.84)       
Remittances 0.136 0.146  -0.155*** -0.123*** -0.141*** -0.148*** -0.088* 
 (1.64) (1.34)  (2.78) (3.90) (3.32) (2.89) (1.98) 
Remittances×GDP per capita instability -0.038*** -0.047**       
 (2.97) (2.06)       
Aid  -0.003   -0.145*   -0.130 
  (0.02)   (1.74)   (1.33) 
Dependency ratio      0.113*  0.122** 
      (1.99)  (2.15) 
Constant 17.576* 18.080*  -0.390 5.827 -9.995 8.379 -1.636 
 (1.77) (1.69)  (0.05) (0.73) (0.95) (0.86) (0.15) 
Observations 251 249  326 323 317 307 304 
Countries 72 72  83 83 81 77 77 
Joint significance of remittance (p-value) 0.002 0.050       
Turning point of remittances ratio 20% 16%       
AR(1):p-value 0.002 0.004  0.033 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.041 
AR(2):p-value 0.941 0.947  0.232 0.435 0.111 0.086 0.100 
Hansen p-value: 0.885 0.669  0.276 0.188 0.624 0.484 0.344 
Instruments 30 36  20 22 21 21 24 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are 
included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six non-overlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004.  
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 5: Remittances, Financial Constraints and Household Consumption instability  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lag dependent var. 0.245** 0.212* 0.259** 0.202** 
 (2.02) (1.91) (2.62) (2.44) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.001 -0.045 -0.264 -1.631* 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.81) (1.82) 
Trade openness 0.034 0.023 0.026 0.042** 
 (1.25) (1.12) (1.13) (2.05) 
Population -0.652 -0.761 -0.466 -0.201 
 (1.00) (1.46) (0.95) (0.46) 
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.168* 0.115* 0.046 0.074* 
 (1.81) (1.76) (0.80) (1.82) 
Democracy -3.988** -3.695* -2.775 -0.605 
 (2.18) (1.92) (1.36) (0.28) 
Private credit ratio -0.027 -0.028 -0.026 -0.058** 
 (1.13) (1.08) (1.14) (2.31) 
Remittances -0.161** -0.159** -0.183** -0.186** 
 (2.11) (2.19) (2.23) (2.13) 
Remittances×Private credit ratio 0.004* 0.005* 0.005* 0.006* 
 (1.81) (1.71) (1.81) (1.71) 
Financial openness  2.845* 2.719* 3.662** 
  (1.99) (1.78) (2.40) 
(Financial openness)²  -0.602** -0.551* -0.680** 
  (2.34) (1.95) (2.46) 
GDP per capita instability   0.605*** 0.635*** 
   (3.64) (3.76) 
Aid    -0.248 
    (1.40) 
Constant 14.205 15.720* 9.798 14.077 
 (1.36) (1.87) (1.22) (1.19) 
Observations 251 251 251 249 
Countries 72 72 72 72 
Joint significance of remittances’ coef. (p-val) 0.114 0.094 0.090 0.100 
Private credit turning-point (% GDP) 44.09 32.94 34.94 31.55 
Countries below the threshold of private cred. 65 60 60 60 
Percentage of countries below the threshold 90 83 83 83 
AR(1):p-value 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.005 
AR(2):p-value 0.770 0.691 0.923 0.782 
Hansen p-value 0.633 0.603 0.896 0.936 
Instruments 24 31 33 34 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust 
correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is 
the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six 
non-overlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. Dependent variable: Household consumption 
instability. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 6: Remittances, financial constraints and the ratio of 
consumption instability to GDP per capita instability 
 (1) (2) 
Population -0.164  
 (0.41)  
Initial GDP per capita -1.262*** -0.883** 
 (3.00) (2.53) 
Trade openness 0.045** 0.046*** 
 (2.24) (3.54) 
Financial openness 1.520 0.258 
 (1.47) (0.18) 
(Financial openness)² -0.295 -0.071 
 (1.50) (0.24) 
Aid -0.128 -0.106 
 (1.45) (1.32) 
Private credit ratio -0.047** -0.039** 
 (2.48) (2.55) 
Remittances -0.169*** -0.135*** 
 (3.55) (2.92) 
Remittances×Private credit ratio 0.005** 0.004* 
 (2.16) (1.94) 
Dependency ratio  0.096 
  (1.60) 
Constant 10.666 1.680 
 (1.21) (0.43) 
Observations 323 314 
Countries 83 81 
Joint significance of remittances (p-value) 0.002 0.016 
Turning point for private credit ratio 33.915 35.968 
Countries below the threshold of credit  72 72 
Percentage of countries below the threshold 87 89 
AR(1):p-value 0.034 0.037 
AR(2):p-value 0.223 0.106 
Hansen p-value 0.338 0.381 
Instruments 24 22 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) 
small sample robust correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. t-
statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the five-year standard deviation 
of the growth rate of the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six non-
overlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. Dependent variable: The 
ratio of household consumption instability to GDP per capita instability. *** 
p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Remittances, financial constraints and the ratio of 
consumption instability to GDP per capita instability: 
Nonlinear System-GMM method 
Remittances -0.067** 
 (2.14) 
Remittances×dFD=1[FD>13.5%] 0.097*** 
 (2.72) 
Private credit ratio -0.037*** 
 (3.00) 
Initial GDP per capita -1.217** 
 (2.63) 
Trade openness 0.041** 
 (2.28) 
Financial openness 1.379 
 (1.41) 
(Financial openness)² -0.268 
 (1.39) 
Aid -0.142* 
 (1.95) 
Dependency ratio 0.009 
 (0.05) 
Constant 7.355 
 (0.69) 
Observations 314 
Countries 81 
Joint significance of remittances (p-value) 0.008 
Threshold of private credit ratio 13.531% 
Countries below the threshold 43 
Percentage of countries below the threshold 53 
AR(1):p-value 0.034 
AR(2):p-value 0.100 
Hansen p-value 0.396 
Instruments 24 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with 
Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. Time effects are 
included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. 
Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of 
the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six non-
overlapping five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. Dependent 
variable: The ratio of household consumption instability to GDP per 
capita instability. *** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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Table 8: Impact of remittances on the sensitivity of household consumption to several 
shocks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lag dependent variable 0.350* 0.247* 0.227* 
 (1.94) (1.69) (1.88) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.789 -0.602 -0.008 
 (1.22) (1.42) (0.01) 
Trade openness 0.030 0.022 0.018 
 (1.00) (1.21) (0.91) 
Population -1.661 -0.870** -1.112 
 (1.52) (2.03) (1.60) 
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.183** 0.092* 0.214* 
 (2.19) (1.86) (1.97) 
Democracy 4.798 -2.493 -2.384 
 (1.35) (1.35) (0.92) 
Financial openness -0.213 0.303 1.375 
 (0.15) (0.43) (1.58) 
(Financial openness)² 0.035 -0.024 -0.264 
 (0.14) (0.17) (1.51) 
Private credit ratio -0.011 0.010 -0.018 
 (0.40) (0.49) (0.93) 
Remittances 0.081 0.108 0.090 
 (0.83) (1.64) (0.96) 
Remittances×Natural disasters -0.032**   
 (2.51)   
Natural disasters 0.114   
 (1.29)   
Instability of agricultural value added  0.119**  
  (2.30)  
Remittances×Instability of agricultural value added  -0.012***  
  (4.22)  
Remittances×Discretionary fiscal policy   -0.023** 
   (2.35) 
Constant 31.445* 20.176*** 20.686* 
 (1.76) (2.74) (1.84) 
Observations 251 242 251 
Countries 72 72 72 
Joint significance of remittances’ coeff. (p-value) 0.011 0.000 0.002 
Turning point of remittances ratio 3% 10% 9% 
Countries above the threshold 33 10 12 
Percentage of countries above the threshold 46% 14% 17% 
AR(1):p-value 0.004 0.004 0.002 
AR(2):p-value 0.717 0.716 0.903 
Hansen p-value: 0.379 0.694 0.598 
Instruments 29 35 27 
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction. 
Time effects are included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the five-year 
standard deviation of the growth rate of the corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six non-overlapping 
five-year periods between 1975 and 2004. Dependent variable: Household consumption growth instability.  
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
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Table 9: Threshold effects in the relationship between remittances and 
household consumption instability: Nonlinear System-GMM method 
 (1) (2)  
Lag dependent variable 0.228* 0.240*  
 (1.70) (1.75)  
Remittances -0.822** -0.820*  
 (2.44) (1.92)  
Remittances×dr=1[R>8.5%] 0.702** 0.700*  
 (2.13) (1.69)  
GDP per capita instability  0.397*  
  (1.67)  
Private credit ratio -0.002 -0.001  
 (0.10) (0.03)  
Population -0.084 -0.275  
 (0.13) (0.55)  
Financial openness 2.042* 2.245  
 (1.97) (1.56)  
(Financial openness)² -0.330* -0.379  
 (1.68) (1.45)  
Discretionary fiscal policy 0.135* 0.061  
 (1.87) (0.67)  
Initial GDP per capita -0.532 -0.622**  
 (1.36) (2.07)  
Democracy -4.925** -3.870*  
 (2.38) (1.73)  
Trade openness 0.028 0.021  
 (1.04) (0.78)  
Constant 8.751 11.380  
 (0.73) (1.17)  
Observations 251 251  
Countries 72 72  
Joint significance of remittances (p-value) 0.016   
Threshold of remittances ratio 8.536%   
Countries above the threshold of remittances 13   
Percentage of countries above the threshold 18   
AR(1):p-value 0.003 0.004  
AR(2):p-value 0.717 0.703  
Hansen p-value 0.857 0.614  
Instruments 35 38  
Note: The estimation method is two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample 
robust correction. Time effects are included in all the regressions. t-statistics are below the 
coefficients. Instability is the five-year standard deviation of the growth rate of the 
corresponding variable. Data are averaged over six non-overlapping five-year periods between 
1975 and 2004. Dependent variable: Household consumption instability.  
*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the coefficient associated to the interactive term of remittances with the private 
credit ratio: Nonlinear System GMM Estimation 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the coefficient associated to nonlinear term in remittances: Nonlinear System GMM Estimation 
 
 
 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0,54 3,04 5,54 8,04 10,54 13,04 15,54
(Rxdr) Coeff.
Confidence interval at 95%
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
0,54 3,04 5,54 8,04 10,54 13,04 15,54
p-value (Rxdr) 
Coeff.
p-value 5%
p-value 10%
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
0,54 3,04 5,54 8,04 10,54 13,04 15,54
Remittances % GDP
Hansen p-value
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.15 
 
 31 
APPENDIX 2: DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES  
Household consumption instability: standard deviation of the household consumption per capita growth rate 
estimated over non-overlapping 5 years. Household consumption per capita are drawn from World Bank tables, 
World Development Indicators (2009) 
Gross domestic product per capita: logarithm of the GDP per capita. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars 
(World Development Indicators, 2009) 
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product (World Development Indicators, 2009) 
Population: logarithm of the total population in corresponding countries (World Development Indicators, 2009) 
Remittances: Ratio of workers’ remittances and compensation of employees to GDP. Workers' remittances and 
compensation of employees comprise current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by 
nonresident workers. Workers’ remittances are classified as current private transfers from migrant workers who 
are residents of the host country to recipients in their country of origin. They include only transfers made by 
workers who have been living in the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration status. 
Compensation of employees is the income of migrants who have lived in the host country for less than a year. 
Migrants’ transfers are defined as the net worth of migrants who are expected to remain in the host country for 
more than one year that is transferred from one country to another at the time of migration. (World Development 
Indicators, 2009) 
Private credit ratio: Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Ross Levine, (2000), “A New Database on Financial Development and Structure”) 
Financial openness: defined as 2+KAOPEN, where KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Variable 
(Chinn and Ito, (2008), “A New Measure of Financial Openness”). The index takes on higher values the more 
open the country is to cross-border capital transactions. KAOPEN takes into account four major categories on 
the restrictions on external account: 1-the presence of multiple exchange rates, 2-restrictions on the current 
account transactions, 3-restrictions on the capital account transactions, 4-the requirement of the surrender of 
export proceeds. 
Democracy: Democracy index (polity score): Scale from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating full autocracy and 1 full 
democracy. (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) 
Aid: Ratio of foreign aid to Gross National Income (GNI). Aid includes both official development assistance 
(ODA) and official aid. Ratios are computed using values in U.S. dollars (World Development Indicators, 2009) 
GDP per capita growth volatility: standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate estimated over non-
overlapping 5 years (World Development Indicators, 2009) 
Dependency ratio: Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population). Data are drawn from World 
Development Indicators (2009) 
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Notes 
                                                 
1The definition of variables, sources of data and descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 1. 
2
 Fiscal policy is consisting of three components: (a) automatic stabilizers, (b) discretionary fiscal policy that 
reacts to the state of the economy, and (c) discretionary policy that is implemented for reasons other than current 
macroeconomic conditions. We focus only on the last component of fiscal policy, i.e., changes in the cyclically 
adjusted fiscal policy stance. 
3
 Current output growth is instrumented with two lags of GDP growth and lagged inflation. We include inflation 
to ensure that the results are not driven by high inflation episodes in which the co-movement between real 
government spending and output might be due to monetary instability rather than fiscal policy. Inflation squared 
is included to control for a possible nonlinear relationship between inflation and spending. The model is 
estimated for each country separately. 
4
 The paper uses the System-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data 
with the Windmeijer (2005) correction for finite sample bias.  
5In all specifications, only periods dummies and initial GDP per capita are taken as strictly exogenous. 
6
 Chami et al. (2008) first computed this instrument for migrants’ remittances. They retained the ratio of 
remittances to GDP of all other recipient countries as instrument. We follow their work but with the difference 
that we retain the remittances of all other neighbors. This variable catches various trends in remittances 
throughout regions of the world, including changes in transactions costs and at the same time should not directly 
affect consumption instability. The instrument excludes the remittance-to-GDP ratio of the country in question 
thereby freeing it of a direct causal link with other domestic macroeconomic and policy variables that also 
influence consumption instability. We also compute the GDP per capita in migrants’ host countries by weighting 
GDP per capita of all other countries by the share that each of these countries represents in the emigration of 
workers of each developing countries. Bilateral migration matrix used to make calculations is drawn from World 
Bank web site: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21154867~
pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html 
7
 Bekaert et al. (2006) use the same ratio to find out whether consumers were better able to smooth consumption 
after equity market liberalizations. 
8
  Demographic dependent ratio is added to the control variables since the active population may cope easier  
with shocks. 
9
 We have also tested a more complex non-linear model with endogenous thresholds on financial development, 
but results were not conclusive.  
10
 The results are robust to the introduction of the demographic dependency ratio (column 2) 
11
 Another approach might consist in an estimation using the Hansen methodology and assuming that the 
threshold variable is exogenous. However, in our case private credit ratio cannot be considered as strictly 
exogenous. 
12
 The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Diseases (CRED) has collected and made publically 
available data on the occurrence and effects of natural disasters from 1900 to the present with a worldwide 
coverage. The database is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, insurance companies, research institutions and press agencies. The EM-DAT data is publicly 
available on CRED's web site at: www.cred.be. 
13
 These disasters can be grouped into several categories, of which meteorological disasters (floods, wave surges, 
storms, droughts, landslides and avalanches), climatological disasters (disasters caused due to long run or 
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seasonal climatic variability such as drought, extreme temperatures and wild fire) and geophysical disasters 
(earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions).   
14Several papers have shown that higher amounts of remittances lead to an appreciation of real exchange rate in 
developing countries. Also, remittances have a flip side in the sense that remittances can be a source of Dutch 
disease (see Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Lartey et al., 2008). 
